- P-ISSN 2586-2995
- E-ISSN 2586-4130
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KDI Journal of Economic Policy. Vol. 38, No. 2, May 2016, pp. 87-101
https://doi.org/10.23895/kdijep.2016.38.2.87
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A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns
Abstract
A person’s life consists of two important stages: the first stage as a student and the second stage as a worker. In an integrated model of education and career concerns, I analyze the welfare effects of education. In Spence’s job market signaling model, education as a sorting device improves efficiency by mitigating the lemon market problem. In contrast, in the integrated model, education as a sorting device can be detrimental to social welfare, as it eliminates work incentives generated by career concerns.
Keywords
education, signaling, career concerns
JEL Code
D86, G38
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Other articles from this issue
- Inference and Forecasting Based on the Phillips Curve
- Private Equity as an Alternative Corporate Restructuring Scheme: Does Private Equity Increase the Operating Performance of PE-Backed Firms?
- The Interaction between China, Japan, and Korea in the Export Market
- The Impact of Government Support of Graduate Schools on the Research Productivity of Professors and Students
- A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns
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